This paper presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic choice under risk. In this model, when it comes to choosing one lottery over another, each alternative has a chance of being selected, unless one lottery stochastically dominates the other. An individual behaves as if he compares lotteries to a reference lottery-a least upper bound or a greatest lower bound in terms of weak dominance. The proposed model is compatible with several well-known violations of expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect and the violations of the betweenness. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the proposed model are completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity, common consequence independence, outcome monotonicity, and odds ratio independence.
Probabilistic Choice and Stochastic Dominance

I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present a simple model of decision making under risk that captures two stylized facts: 1) in general, people choose probabilistically between risky lotteries; 2) people seldom violate strict dominance or transparent first-order stochastic dominance. Numerous experimental studies of repeated decision making under risk demonstrate that individual choices are probabilistic in nature (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Starmer and Sugden, 1989; Hey and Orme, 1994; Wu, 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Loomes and Sugden, 1998; Hey, 2001; Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Schmidt and Neugebauer, 2007) .
For example, consider a choice between getting £10 for certain and a 50%-50% chance of receiving either £30 or nothing. When facing this decision problem repeatedly, some people opt for the sure amount on one occasion and for the risky lottery on the other. Loomes and Sugden (1998) observe that 11 out of 46 subjects (23.9%) reverse their initial choice on the second repetition of this decision problem. Traditional decision theories (e.g. expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory) interpret such contradictory choice pattern as a sign of indifference between the sure amount and the risky lottery.
Consider now a choice between £10 for certain and a risky lottery that yields a 60% chance of £30 (zero otherwise). If an individual is genuinely indifferent between £10 for sure and a 50% chance of £30, he strictly prefers a 60% chance of £30 over £10 for sure.
However, Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that 9 out of 46 subjects (19.6%) choose £10 for sure over a 50% chance of £30 and vice versa and they also choose £10 for sure over a 60% chance of £30 on at least one occasion. Traditional decision theories cannot explain this empirical finding because an individual cannot be simultaneously indifferent between £10 for sure, a 50% chance of £30 and a 60% chance of £30.
Even though people choose probabilistically between £10 for sure and a 50% chance of £30 as well as between £10 for sure and a 60% chance of £30, they do not choose probabilistically between a 50% chance of £30 and a 60% chance of £30. People seldom violate strict dominance or transparent first-order stochastic dominance (e.g. Carbone and Hey, 1995; Loomes and Sugden, 1998; Hey, 2001) . For example, Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that only one out of 46 subjects (2.2%) has chosen a 15% chance of £30 over a 20% chance of £30 (zero otherwise) on one of two repetitions of the decision problem.
Popular models of probabilistic choice such as the Fechner model of random errors (Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994; Hey, 1995; Buschena and Zilberman, 2000) , the Luce choice model (Luce and Suppes, 1965; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996) , and the constant error/tremble model (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Carbone, 1997; Loomes et al., 2002) generally predict too many violations of strict dominance and transparent stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2007) develops a model of probabilistic choice (stochastic expected utility theory) that rules out violations of strict dominance but allows for violations of stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2006b) extends this model to discriminate between low rates of violation when stochastic dominance is transparent and high rates of violation when stochastic dominance is not transparent. Fishburn (1978) presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic binary choice (incremental expected utility advantage model) that does not allow for any violations of stochastic dominance. A popular random utility model (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) Binary choice probabilities admit representation (1) if and only if they satisfy the following axioms: completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity, common consequence independence, outcome monotonicity and odds ratio independence. The proposed model of probabilistic choice is compatible with several well-known violations of expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect (e.g. Allais, 1953) and the violations of the betweenness property (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994 ).
The proposed model of probabilistic choice has a simple interpretation. Stochastic dominance imposes a greatest lower bound on every pair of lotteries. This greatest lower bound serves as an endogenous reference lottery. An individual compares two lotteries relative to this natural referent. The closer is lottery A (B) to the reference lottery B A ∧ in terms of expected utility, the closer is the choice probability P(A,B) to zero (one).
Model (1) has the same functional form as the strict utility model discussed in Becker et al. (1963) with the only difference that lotteries are compared to a reference lottery B A ∧ . In other words, we can consider a strict utility model as a variation of choice rule (1) when the reference lottery is zero for all lottery pairs. In contrast, the model of probabilistic choice proposed in this paper has an endogenous reference lottery B A ∧ . This reference lottery captures the context of a decision problem. In particular, it allows a decision maker to avoid violations of stochastic dominance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents six axioms imposed on a primitive binary choice probability function (a fuzzy preference relation) and discusses their descriptive validity. Section III contains the main result of the paper-a representation theorem for binary choice probabilities and discusses its main implications and possible extensions. Section IV generalizes the proposed model from binary choice to choice among m>2 alternatives. Section V concludes. 
II. Axioms
,..., 1 ∈ , and 1
A degenerate lottery that yields one outcome X x i ∈ with probability one is denoted by i X .
A compound lottery . The set of all risky lotteries is denoted by ℒ.
The primitive of choice is a binary choice probability function P:
which is also known as a fuzzy preference relation (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1984) . P (A,B) represents the probability that an individual chooses lottery A over lottery B in a direct binary choice. For any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ, B A ≠ , probability P(A,B) is observable from a relative frequency with which an individual chooses A when he is asked to choose repeatedly between A and B. Probability P(A,A), A∈ℒ, cannot be observed from actual choices and it is not defined. We now present six axioms imposed on binary choice probability function. Axiom 2a imposes a basic consistency requirement on binary choice probabilities. If an individual is likely to choose A over B and he is also likely to choose B over C, then this individual is also likely to choose A over C. Empirical data generally support weak stochastic transitivity (e.g. Luce and Suppes, 1965; Tversky and Russo, 1969; Luce, 1977) .
Part b) of Axiom 2 slightly strengthens traditional weak stochastic transitivity. In particular, it postulates that if an individual always chooses A over B and he always chooses B over C, then this individual always chooses A over C. 
If we set 0 = α then Axiom 5 states that choice under certainty is deterministic. If an individual faces a choice between two sure things, then he always chooses the same alternative. This is particularly appealing when lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs and people care for money. For instance, it appears quite intuitive that a sure prospect of receiving £30 is always chosen over a sure prospect of receiving £10.
1
More generally, Axiom 5 states that choice between a sure outcome and a binary lottery that involves this outcome is deterministic. Again this is quite intuitive if lottery outcomes can be ordered in a natural way. For instance, a prospect of a healthy life is always preferred over a medical treatment that provides full recovery with probability α<1.
Axiom 5 is a weaker version of the principle of internality, which is used in several models of probabilistic choice (e.g. Blavatskyy 2006b; 2007) and appears to be descriptively valid.
2
If Axioms 1, 2b and 5 hold, then, without loss of generality, we can number lottery Experimental evidence shows that people can violate stochastic dominance much more frequently if two lotteries are framed so that the dominance relation is not transparent (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Birnbaum, 2004; 2005a; 2005b) . However, such violations appear to result from improper understanding of a decision problem. When the same binary choice problem is presented in a different format so that the dominance relation becomes transparent, the rates of violation significantly decrease (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Birnbaum, 2004) . Hence, the implications of Proposition 2 appear to be descriptively acceptable provided that people comprehend stochastic dominance when they face it.
Proposition 3
The partially ordered set (ℒ, ) is a lattice.
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 3 Marley (1997) discusses the role of such natural contextual reference points in different models of probabilistic choice.
Axiom 6 (Odds Ratio Independence) For any three lotteries A,B,C∈ℒ such that
is independent of A.
Axiom 6 Intuitively, Axiom 6 plays the role of an exchange rate. Axiom 6 allows us to bring various choice probabilities to a common denominator. Such an axiom is not required in traditional deterministic decision theories because they deal with degenerate choice probabilities that take only two values-either one or zero. Since Axiom 6 is a new axiom that is not used in the existing axiomatic models of probabilistic choice, I am not aware of any empirical tests of Axiom 6.
III. Representation Theorem
Proposition 4 Proof is presented in the Appendix.
When lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs, formula (2) implies that P(A,B)=1 if
A stochastically dominates B, 4 and that P(A,B)=0 if B stochastically dominates A. 5 Formula (2) also implies that P(A,B)=0.5 if the expected utility of lottery A is exactly equal to the expected utility of lottery B.
Note that lottery B A ∧ yields outcome i x with probability i c ,
one possible interpretation of model (2) is the following. Lotteries A and B are evaluated relative to the endogenous reference lottery, which is their greatest lower bound B A ∧ .
The closer is lottery A (B) to the reference lottery B A ∧ in terms of expected utility, the closer is binary choice probability P(A,B) to zero (one). Function (.) captures the sensitivity of binary choice probabilities to changes in the expected utility of lotteries relative to the endogenous reference lottery. 4 In this case Models of probabilistic choice can be conveniently presented in the probability triangle (e.g. Machina, 1982) . When lotteries have no more than three outcomes (n=3), the set of all lotteries ℒ can be represented as a rectangular triangle. The probability of the first outcome (b 1 ) is conventionally shown on the horizontal axis. The probability of the third outcome (b 3 ) is typically shown on the vertical axis. We will select an arbitrary lottery A inside the probability triangle and then plot the set of all other lotteries B such that P(A,B) is constant. 
Nonlinearity of choice probabilities illustrated by Figure 1d ) suggests that model (2) can explain some violations of expected utility theory if the function (.) is not homogeneous. For instance, model (2) is compatible with certain types of the common ratio effect as well as with violations of the betweenness property.
The common ratio effect is typically illustrated with lotteries over three monetary more often than quasi-convex preferences or vice versa (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994) . If binary choices are independent then the violations of the betweenness are observed if
P(A,B)≠P(A,M). If choice probabilities admit representation (2) then P(A,B)≠P(A,M) if and
only if the following condition holds:
where U(.) denotes the expected utility of a corresponding lottery. If the function (.) is not homogeneous then condition (4) holds for at least one pair of lotteries A and B. Thus, model (2) is compatible with the violations of the betweenness property.
It is interesting to note that for any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ a compound lottery 0.5A+0.5B is equivalent to a compound lottery
and we can rewrite equation (2) as follows:
Thus, in this model, we can compare lotteries relative to their greatest lower bound, or, equivalently, relative to their least upper bound. The closer is lottery A (B) to lottery B A ∨ in terms of expected utility, the closer is binary choice probability P(A,B) to one (zero).
A natural extension of this model is to weaken the axiom of common consequence independence to accommodate, for example, choice patterns observed in the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) . Axiom 4 can be replaced by the axioms of non-expected utility theories, provided that these axioms are reformulated in terms of a primitive binary choice probability function rather than a primitive binary preference relation. However, such extensions may require different binary operations ∨ and ∧ on ℒ than those derived from the partial order . Operations ∨ and ∧ derived from are linear in probabilities, which is a convenient property in conjunction with Axiom 4, but it may be unnecessary if Axiom 4 is relaxed.
IV. Choice among m>2 alternatives
A model of binary choice can be generalized to choice among m>2 alternatives. Luce and Suppes (1965, pp. 351-352) give an example of the following algorithm. When choosing among m>2 alternatives, an individual first selects two alternatives at random and chooses between them. The chosen alternative is then compared to another randomly selected alternative. This step is subsequently repeated i.e. the individual chooses between a previously chosen alternative and another randomly selected element of the choice set S={A 1 ,…,A m }. Let Q(A i |S) t denote the probability that the i-th alternative A i , i∈{1,…,m}, is chosen over another randomly selected alternative at the iteration t∈ℕ of this algorithm.
Probabilities Q(A i |S) t are recursively defined by the following system of equations: The probability that A i is chosen from the set S is defined as ( ) ( )
for all i∈{1,…,m}. In other words, we calculate the chance that an individual chooses the ith alternative from the set S as if the individual continues the sequence of binary choices described above ad infinitum. A vector Q = (Q(A 1 |S), …, Q(A m |S))´ is an asymptotic probability distribution on S, which solves the following homogeneous matrix equation (7) ( ) ( )
where P is a transition matrix on the right-hand side of (6) and I is the m×m identity matrix.
Before presenting a solution to (7), it is convenient to introduce the following notation. Let G denote an arborescence with the vertex set S and let Γ (S) be the set of all arborescences with the vertex set S. Let R(G) be the root of G and let E(G) be the edge set of G. Note that the elements of E(G) are ordered pairs of lotteries {A,B} such that A,B∈S
and A≠B. The product
is the probability that an individual chooses the initial vertex (tail) A over the terminal vertex (head) B in all edges of an arborescence G.
With this notation, vector Q that solves (7) can be written as
where λ is an arbitrary constant.
Since choice probabilities should add up to one, i.e.
Thus, an individual chooses a lottery
A i ∈S from a non-singleton choice set S with a probability
where binary choice probabilities P(A,B) are given in equation (5) and i∈{1,…,m}. Equation (9) allows us to generalize any model of binary choice to choice among m>2 alternatives and it has several intuitive properties. For example, if an individual always (never) chooses one lottery over every other element of a choice set in a direct binary choice, then he also always (never) chooses this lottery from the overall choice set. If an individual chooses with probabilities 50%-50% between any two lotteries from a given choice set, then each lottery is selected with equal probability (1/m) from this choice set.
V. Conclusion
This paper presents a simple axiomatic model of decision making under risk. In this model, when it comes to choosing one lottery over another, each alternative has a chance of being selected, unless one lottery stochastically dominates the other. It is straightforward to apply the proposed model in empirical research. In order to estimate a binary choice probability a researcher needs to calculate only the expected utilities of three lotteries-the two lotteries that are compared and their greatest lower bound (or their least upper bound) in terms of weak dominance. The greatest lower bound or the least upper bound serves as a natural endogenous reference lottery to which lotteries are compared.
The representation theorem shows that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the model are four relatively standard axioms (completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity and common consequence independence) and two relatively new axioms (outcome monotonicity and odds ratio independence). Outcome monotonicity requires that choice under certainty is deterministic. Odds ratio independence connects binary choice probabilities of different values. Both standard and new axioms are formulated in terms of a primitive binary choice probability function. Thus, they can be easily tested on experimental data.
The proposed model is compatible with several well-known violations of expected utility theory. In particular, the model can accommodate the common ratio effect and violations of the betweenness. The proposed model is also quite general. It can be applied to a variety of choice situations, where lottery outcomes are not necessarily monetary payoffs. Finally, although the baseline model is developed for binary choice, it can be easily extended to choice situations where a decision maker faces m>2 alternatives.
Appendix
Before we prove Proposition 1, it is convenient to prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma A1 If Axioms 1-4 hold then P(A,0.5A+0.5B)=0.5 for any two lotteries
A,B∈ℒ such that B A ≠ and P(A,B)=0.5. 
Axiom 4 implies that P(A,0.5A+0.5B)=P(0.5A+0.5B,B). Let us denote this
= + − + + B A A P α α α α .
Proof of Proposition 1
Since X is a finite set, Axioms 1 and 2a imply that the elements of X can be ordered
. We will now prove Proposition 1 in several steps.
Step 1 
for any probability
. Let us now assume that the statement holds for any 1 − ≤ k n and let us prove that it also holds for k n = . Note that lottery A(a 1 ,…,a k ) can be written as a compound
, where lottery A′ is Lemma A2 then implies that
Step 2. Prove Proposition 1 in case when (
In Step 3. Prove that for any A∈ℒ such that 
and Axiom 2a subsequently implies that
. However, we already considered this case in step 2. Thus, let us consider the case when
is not the same lottery as
by our choice of integers k and m it follows that
. However, we already considered this case in step 2.
Therefore, it must be the case that
Step 4. Prove that for any A∈ℒ there is a unique number U(A) such that P (A,B) Let us assign a number U(A) to any lottery A∈ℒ in the following manner. If [ ]
, then it must be the case that U(A)=U(B) because we proved in step 3 that there is only one
and again it must be the case that U(A)=U(B).
If U(A)=U(B) and
Step 5. Prove that
, which can be rearranged into the following equation:
Hence, if we set 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof by mathematical induction. Let us first prove Proposition 2 for lotteries with only two outcomes. In this case lottery
Axiom 5 implies that
. Let us now prove that this probability cannot be equal to zero. We will construct a sequence { } 
Axiom 3 implies that the set
Each element of the sequence { } ∞ =1 k k α belongs to this set. Thus, the limit of the sequence should be in this set as well. This means that
Thus, this probability cannot be equal to zero and it must be equal to one due to Axiom 5. 
. Since we already established that ( ) ( )
Proof of Proposition 3
For any ( 
Proof of Proposition 4
It is a relatively straightforward algebraic exercise to demonstrate that if binary choice probabilities admit representation (2) then they satisfy Axioms 1-6. Therefore, I will only prove the sufficiency of Axioms 1-6.
Consider an arbitrary pair of lotteries A,B∈ℒ such that B A ≠ . Note that if
due to Proposition 2 and equation (2) 
where C∈ℒ is an arbitrary lottery such that
Proposition 4 in several steps.
Step 1. Prove that function f has the following form ( ) ( ) ( )
Since equation (10) 
, .
We can also substitute lottery B with lottery D in equation (10) and obtain:
If we multiply equation (11) on equation (12) and use the identity in equation (10), we obtain:
Equation (13) Step 2. Prove that function  has the following form ( Since the right hand side of (17) does not depend on C it must be the case that ( ) ( 
